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Resumen: Ambos extremos geográficos de Eurasia continental (la Unión Europea y China) prolongan 
sus mutuas influencias, así como sobre todo el territorio existente entre ambos. Sin embargo, los 
resultados obtenidos aumentan las asimetrías preexistentes entre ambas partes. Así, la iniciativa europea 
TRACECA asume un reto considerable, pero solo trece países se han sumado al proyecto. Por su parte, el 
proyecto auspiciado por China, la iniciativa llamada Franja y Ruta (nueva ruta de la seda), comprende 
ciento treinta y un países y treinta organizaciones internacionales. China desarrolla pues una estrategia de 
interconectividad más amplia, tanto desde el punto de vista político como financiero, con el 
establecimiento del Banco Asiático de Inversión e Infraestructuras. El resultado no es solo que China esté 
reforzando sus lazos con aquellos países situados a lo largo de la ruta hacia la UE, sino que además está 
aumentando su influencia sobre la Unión Europea, especialmente sobre los Estados de la Europa central, 
oriental (PECOS) y del sur. La razón de esta asimetría no es solo la pujanza de China, sino también la 
falta de cohesión de la UE. En este artículo analizamos la BRI y sus efectos sobre la cohesión de la UE. 
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Abstract: Both geographical ends of continental Eurasia, i.e. the European Union and China, are trying 
to spread their respective influence toward each other, as well as the rest of the Eurasian countries. 
However, the results differ, and therefore the asymmetries between both sides increase. Hence, the EU’s 
TRACECA is undertaking a great task, but only thirteen countries have joined the project, whereas 
China’s New Silk Road, officially named the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) holds one hundred and thirty 
one countries and thirty international organizations. China is developing a more comprehensive 
interconnectivity strategy, both politically, with the support of the 16+1 and the Southern Europe 
Initiatives, as well as financially, with the rise of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The result is 
that China is not only tightening its links with the countries along the routes toward the EU, but is also 
strengthening its influence over the European Union, especially Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as 
well as Southern Europe. The reason for these asymmetries is not only China’s strength, but also the lack 
of cohesion of the EU. In this article we analyze the relationships between BRI and the cohesion of the 
EU. 
 
Keywords: New Silk Road, Belt and Road Initiative, BRI, OBOR, inner cohesion, European Union, 
16+1 Initiative, Southern Europe Initiative. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There are several innovative cooperation types between the EU and China. 
Among them, TRACECA and BRI are noteworthy. These projects will be explored 
in this article not only because the issue is highly topical, but also for their particular 
significance as they exemplify the cohesion developed by both parties involved and 
all the countries along the route. 
In this article we analyze the said projects and how BRI might affect the 
cohesion of the EU. 
2. EU AND TRACECA V. CHINA AND BRI 
The EU is diversifying its transport modalities using new land corridors to 
help its exports to Eurasia: TRACECA1. TRACECA is a land corridor connecting 
East and Central Asia with Central and Western Europe. TRACECA was created at 
the Conference in Brussels, in May 1993, initially involving eight non-EU member 
states, which lately increased. To date thirteen member states have joined 
TRACECA2. It is financed by the European Commission.  
The agenda of TRACECA is considerable: 
 
“To present more than 70 projects were financed by the European Commission within 
the framework of TRACECA. The realized projects helped to attract investments to 
the region. According to experts’ information, the IFI’s [International Financial 
Institutions] investments to transport infrastructure of the TRACECA corridor have 
exceeded 1 billion Euros”3. 
 
According to the above mentioned data, TRACECA is at first sight a 
successful project. However, such a case needs to be compared with another project, 
such as BRI4. Only by comparing both modalities of cooperation will it be possible 
to assess their respective achievements. 
                                                 
1 MLA TRACECA, “Basic Multilateral Agreement on International Transport for Development of the 
Europe-the Caucasus-Asia Corridor”. 
2 Traceca member countries, TRACECA, available at http://www.traceca-org.org/en/countries/ (Last 
visited on 26/07/2019). 
Welcome to TRACECA, TRACECA, available at http://www.traceca-org.org/en/traceca/ (Last visited on 
28/02/2017). 
3 History of TRACECA, How TRACECA started, TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus 
Asia, available at http://www.traceca-org.org/en/traceca/history-of-traceca/ (Last visited on 28/02/2017). 
4 Belt and Road Initiative (一 一路带 ), previously named One Belt One Road (OBOR). 
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China is currently developing suitable strategies about the EU and is showing 
a key capability in our ever changing world, i.e. adaptability. This is what allows 
China to face new scenarios with a chance of success. Nonetheless Europe is also a 
key element for the development of key Chinese projects, as e.g. the BRI 5 plan, as 
well as for the design of major international institutions like the Asian Infrastructure 
and Investment Bank (AIIB) or the construction of a multipolar world6. BRI is “a 
comprehensive domestic and foreign policy concept”7. As mentioned above, the 
agenda of TRACECA entails a considerable commitment but, compared to the one 
of BRI, it is dwarfed: 
 
“Currently, 131 countries and 30 international organizations have joined the 
initiative, through which China has made investments of more than $90 billion to 
these countries and regions”8. 
 
Furthermore, regarding AIIB bank, which gives financial support to BRI, 
John Torpey submits that: 
 
“[w]ith an initial capitalization at its 2014 launch of $100 billion, about half the size 
of the World Bank at the time, the AIIB represents a major shift in world capital 
markets and is widely thought to be a substantial win for the Chinese in its global 
competition with the West”9. 
 
According to the above mentioned statements, TRACECA and BRI are two 
models of cooperation completely different in size and scope. The asymmetry is 
evident. 
                                                 
5 Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk 
Road, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of 
Commerce of the People's Republic of China, with State Council authorization, March 2015, First 
Edition 2015, 
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html 
(Last visited on 10/06/2017). 
6 Huotari, M., Otero-Iglesias, M., Seaman, J. and Ekman, A. (2015): “Mapping Europe-China Relations 
A Bottom-Up Approach”, Merics – Look and Feel, A Report by the European Think-tank Network on 
China (ETNC), 5-6.  
Available at https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/etnc_web_final_1-1.pdf, (Last visited on 
05/03/2017). 
7 Misiągiewicz, J. and Misiągiewicz, M. (2016): “China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative – the 
Perspective of the European Union”, Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska 23 (1), 33-42, 1, 
Available at https://journals.umcs.pl/k/article/download/3494/3628 (Last visited on 31/05/2017). 
8 BRI economies contributing 13.4% of global trade volume, Belt and Road portal, 
Available at https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/info/iList.jsp?tm_id=139&cat_id=10058&info_id=89501 
(Last visited on 03/07/2019). 
9 Torpey, J. (2019): “Who lost Europe to China?”, Forbes, available at  
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johntorpey/2019/06/25/who-lost-europe-to-china/#634cc0183819 (Last 
visited on 28/07/2019). 
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In our view, TRACECA is the project of a bridge between the EU, the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, whereas BRI is a thorough project spreading across 
Eurasia, from one end to the other. In this regard, Halford Mackinder noted in 1904 
that: 
 
“trans-continental railways are now transmuting the conditions of land-power, and 
nowhere can they have such an effect as in the closed heartland of Euro-Asia […]. 
Railways work the greater wonders in the steppe […] the century will not be old 
before all Asia is covered with railways”10. 
 
The said predictions have come to pass. Railways are one of the key 
elements of the new silk roads. BRI is a project entirely designed by China. The 
difference between the EU and China is reflected in the outcome of TRACECA and 
BRI, which, in turn, is expressed in the trade imbalance between the EU and China. 
Tamara Chin, quoted by Ruth Alexander, states that in 1877 Germany sent 
the geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen to China. The purpose of his journey was 
to determine how much coal there was in China, and whether its transportation to 
Europe was feasible. His vision was that of a transcontinental railway from China to 
Europe. He wrote a series of articles about this idea, in which he coined the term 
“Die Seidenstrasse”. But his Swedish pupil Sven Hedin who really developed his 
idea in the 1920s, projected an air route to China as well as a motor route, and he 
named both of them “The Silk Road”.  
Chin considers that this is a European idea. It was in the 1950s and 1960s 
when the Chinese found a purpose for this term; they started conversations with 
their neighbors. Via anti-colonialism, China started its way to become an alternative 
to Western powers. China considered that, in Antiquity, it held friendly relations 
with, e.g. Afghanistan and Somalia, which were disrupted in the XIX century by 
European colonialism. In the 1950s and 1960s the Chinese wanted to revive that 
historical friendship. This very spirit is flourishing nowadays again. The Silk Road 
is, according to China, a proof of its openness; and it is also the mainstay of its 
foreign policy11. 
                                                 
10 Mackinder, H. (1904): “The Geographical Pivot of History”, The Geographical Journal, 170 (4) 
2004, 298 – 321, 311, available at  
https://www.desmogblog.com/sites/beta.desmogblog.com/files/20131016_MackinderTheGeographicalJo
urnal.pdf (Last visited on 31/07/2019). 
Quoted by Chin, T. (2013): “The Invention of the Silk Road, 1877”, Critical Inquiry 40 (1) 194-219, 
Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/673232 
http://tamaratchin.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Chin-Critical-Inquiry.pdf 
(Last visited on 31/05/2017). 
11 Alexander, R., Why does China want to revive the Silk Road?, The Inquiry, BBC World Service, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p055y581 
(Last visited on 31/05/2017). 
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Jane Golley, quoted by Ruth Alexander, describes the New Silk Road as a 
“grand transnational development strategy”12. This statement expresses the ambition 
of BRI, designed to be a project boosting Chinese projection worldwide. 
Adrián Vidales García submits that the international community is becoming 
a uni-multipolar order, in which the US is not the hegemonic power any longer. 
Furthermore, China is becoming an order-shaper, with actions such as the New Silk 
Road, a key element of the XXI century13.  
We concur with the above mentioned statement by Adrian Vidales García. 
However, how is China shaping geopolitics worldwide? Indeed, the effects of 
projects like BRI are the results of China’s economic strength. However, Yan 
Xuetong submits that “during a period of globalization, the sphere of competition is 
no longer about land, resources or markets but rule-making, setting regulations, 
norms or customs”14. 
The above mentioned opinion reflects the multiplying value of politics, 
expressed in the said “rule-making” factor. Moreover, according to Manuel 
Montobbio, China, among other rising powers, might eventually make contributions 
to the “acquis” of international relations15. In fact, such developments could 
increase the asymmetry between the EU and China. 
In our opinion BRI is in fact the Chinese version of globalization. Obviously, 
for decades China has been taking part of globalization, but BRI marks a difference, 
as it is entirely tailored in China. In fact, an initiative such as BRI is based on the 
idea of globalization, although it does not cover the whole of the world, because 
America and Oceania had no direct contact with the original Silk Road. However, 
BRI comprises a larger territory than the original Silk Road. 
Which areas does BRI cover? According to Misiągiewicz, there is no official 
BRI map, but what is certain is that it covers several regions in three continents: 
Asia, Europe and Africa16. The backbone of BRI is formed by:  
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
13 Vidales García, A. (2016): “La nueva ruta de la seda y el resurgimiento geopolítico de China”, 
Opinión 2016 (78), 1, 
http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2016/DIEEEO78-
2016_RutaSeda_geopoliticaChina_AdrianVidales.pdf 
(Last visited on 21/05/2017). 
14 Quoted by D’Hooghe, I. (2010): “The Limits of China’s Soft Power in Europe-Beijing’s Public 
Diplomacy Puzzle”, 
Clingendael Diplomacy Papers, 25, 4, 
Available at 
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20100100_cdsp_paper_dhooghe_china.pdf 
Last visited on 20/03/2017. 
Yan Xuetong quoted by Leonard, M. (2008): What does China Think? PublicAffairs. New York. p. 94. 
15 Montobbio, op. cit., 244. 
16 Misiągiewicz, J. and Misiągiewicz, M., op. cit., 38. 
“The SR outside China spans three continents, Asia, Europe and Africa. The ‘Economic Belt’ contains 
Central Asia, South-East Asia, Russia, Europe (including the Baltic Sea), the Persian Gulf and the 
Mediterranean Sea, and the ‘21st-Century Maritime Silk Road’ embraces harbors along China’s coasts, 
the South China Sea, the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean and Europe. The ‘Maritime Silk Road’, as 
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“Six international economic cooperation corridors, namely the New Eurasian Land 
Bridge, the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, the China-Central Asia-West 
Asia Economic Corridor, the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor, the 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar 
Economic Corridor, link the Asian economic circle with the European one, which 
plays a significant role in establishing and strengthening the partnership of 
connectivity among various countries, and in setting up an efficient and smooth Asia-
Europe market.”17 
 
Hence, BRI will considerably enhance connectivity along a large part of 
Eurasia. 
During the last decades, China has attached great importance to the creation 
of a non-adverse “neighborhood” and to the consolidation of its import-export 
maritime lines. Nowadays, China can be regarded as a world power18. This is one of 
the most relevant elements of the initiative: it should enhance globalization and go a 
step beyond. Chen Zhimin and Zhang Ji argue that:  
 
“[‘one belt, one road’] this excellent interactive mechanism has already taken the first 
steps, and now pushes forward one step beyond towards the enhancement of the 
linkup and cooperation contacts between China and the EU, and initiate a new stage 
of the China-EU relations to have an even stronger wish for globalising strategy”19. 
 
From the above, we can draw a preliminary conclusion: BRI is only a part of 
the Chinese globalising long-term strategy. Thus, BRI also comprises part of Africa 
and this is also the reason for the 16+1 and the South European Countries initiatives. 
                                                                                                                  
envisioned by China, will greatly improve connections between the western Pacific, the Indian Ocean 
and the Mediterranean Sea, between South Asia and East Africa, and between East Asia and Europe. 
China’s initiative for the so-called ‘21st-Century Maritime Silk Road’ is aimed at port development in 
South-East Asia, around the Indian Ocean and in the eastern Mediterranean region. China’s involvement 
in ports and other maritime infrastructure should be seen in the context of its broader infrastructure 
activities under the ‘One Belt, One Road’ programme. Sea lanes and railways complement each other, 
and jointly open up new trade links between regions.” 
17 An Overview of Six Economic Corridors and Six Connectivity Networks, Belt and Road Portal, 
https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/qwyw/rdxw/88408.htm Last visited on 28/07/2019. 
18 Vidales García, A., op. cit., 5. 
19 Unofficial translation. 
Original text:  
“ 种良性的互 机制已 初步形成这 动 经 ，并正在推 中欧 一步接近动 进 和合作关系的提升，  
使新 段的中欧关系再次具有了全球性的 略意阶 战 义。” 
Unofficial translation of the paper: Chen, Zhimin and Zhang, Ji, (2014): “‘One belt, one road’ proposed 
China-EU contact: double-layered European vision”, International Political Economy, School of 
International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, 1, 
Original title of the paper: 
“一 一路带 ”倡 的中欧 接仪 对 ： 双 欧盟的层 视角”, 陈，志敏&张，骥 
http://www.sirpa.fudan.edu.cn/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/g.pdf 
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Apparently the above-mentioned scenario will still be the trend for the oncoming 
years. 
According to China’s government, BRI initiative focuses on “connecting the 
vibrant East Asia economic circle at one end and the developed European economic 
circle at the other end”20.  
The said statement leads to the ideal vision of a win-win relation, since one 
end of BRI is “vibrant”, while the other is “developed”. This idea is linked to the 
concept of cooperation, which leads to interconnectivity, a term already appearing 
in joint statements by the EU and China21. The main aim of BRI is to revitalize the 
old Eurasian “Silk Roads”22. This Chinese initiative is multimodal, fully-
comprehensive and planned for long-term goals. 
On the European side, there is a good example of coordination in the 
European think-tank “Network on China” (ETNC). This Network could be a good 
model for the EU as a coordinated body23. Think-tanks from many EU member 
states have joined this network, and hopefully in the near future every EU member 
state will be represented. Only through this kind of initiatives will the EU be able to 
reduce the asymmetry in the EU-China relations. 
China complements BRI through two different schemes: one is the CEE 
(Central and Eastern Europe) 16+124, and the other one is about six European 
Mediterranean countries25. 
                                                 
20 Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk 
Road, op. cit. 
21 EU-China Summit Joint statement Brussels, 9 April 2019, available at  
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39020/euchina-joint-statement-9april2019.pdf 
(Last visited on 02/07/2019). 
In fact, interconnectivity is, on the one hand, the way to globalise the world, and also the means by which 
China is exporting its huge industrial capacity. But on the other hand, it is also a way to exert influence. 
Furthermore, interconnectivity is not only the means, but also the goal itself, as by doing so, China is also 
exporting its railway industry. Moreover, China’s far-reaching trains also polish its image of a world 
power. 
22 Li, Y, Bolton, K. and Westphal, T. (2016) “The Effect of the New Silk Road Railways on Aggregate 
Trade Volumes between China and Europe”, Working Papers on East Asian Studies 109, 1-18, 
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/142779/1/861804694.pdf (Last visited on 28/07/2019). 
23 Van der Putten, F-P, Seaman, J., Huotari, M., Ekman, A. and Otero-Iglesias, M. (2016): “Europe and 
China’s New Silk Roads”, ETNC Report, p. 4,  
Available at  
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Europe_and_Chinas_New_Silk_Roads_0.pdf 
(Last visited on 31/07/2019). 
24 The Member States being part of the Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European 
countries are: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
And within those 16, the five countries “currently outside of the EU” (on January 16th 2017) are: Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, 
Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, 中国—中 欧国家合作东 ，   
http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/zdogjxty_1/ 
(Last visited on 5/03/2017). 
25 Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Italy, Spain and Portugal. 
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Van der Putten et al. state that BRI projects do not only develop within the 
EU, but they also affect EU member states and have an impact on the EU-China 
relations26. Sometimes, initiatives in the orbit of BRI are more far-reaching than 
BRI, as for example the buildup of a Cross-Docking Center for Hewlett-Packard in 
Piraeus, which actually involves a project with further repercussions on HP factories 
in China27. Parag Khanna and Kishor Mahbubani, submit that 
 
“[i]nvestment from China’s Cosco Shipping rescued Greece’s Piraeus port three years 
ago, turning it into one of Europe’s fastest growing. According to Germany 
newspaper Die Zeit, Piraeus will displace Hamburg as Europe’s third-busiest port this 
year”28. 
 
Hence, as it can be seen above, China economic strength is already operating 
inside the EU. Piraeus port is in the EU, but managed by China. In addition, it is not 
an exception: for instance, China has also entered into Spain’s port business, since 
“Spain’s leading port operator Noatum Ports confirms the conclusion of a 
partnership agreement with the Chinese COSCO Shipping Ports Limited (COSCO) 
for the transfer of 51% of Noatum Ports”29. 
Moreover, this China-Greece relationship seems to be succeeding, as 
apparently, the 16+1 initiative will be enlarged, with Greece, becoming 17+130. 
BRI is most probably the paramount example showing the increasing 
asymmetry between the EU and China. BRI will have a multiplying effect, which 
                                                                                                                  
Van der Putten, F-P, Seaman, J., Huotari, M., Ekman, A. and Otero-Iglesias, M., op. cit., p. 6. 
26 Id, p. 5. 
This phenomenon is due to what Keohane & Nye name “Globalism”, i.e. what they define as “a state of 
the world involving networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances”. 
Keohane, R. and Nye, J. Jr., Globalization: What’s new? What not? (And so what?), Note taken from the 
website: “This article is drawn from the forthcoming third edition of their book Power and 
Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (New York: Longman, 2000)”, 
http://www.asu.edu/courses/pos445/Keohane%20and%20Nye--
Globalization%20What's%20New%3F%20%20What's%20Not%3F.pdf 
(Last visited on 5/03/2017). 
27 Quoted by van der Putten, F-P. (2014): “Chinese Investment in the Port of Piraeus, Greece: The 
Relevance for the EU and the Netherlands”, Clingendael Report, available at 
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/2014%20-
%20Chinese%20investment%20in%20Piraeus%20-%20Clingendael%20Report.pdf 
(Last visited on 5/03/2017). 
28 Khanna, P. and Mahbubani, K. (2019): “Italy joining China’s Belt and Road Initiative highlights 
different approaches of Europe and the US on Asia policy”, South China Morning Post, Published: 
10:00pm, 1 Apr, 2019. Updated: 1:28am, 2 Apr, 2019, Available at  
https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/3004114/italy-joining-chinas-belt-and-road-
initiative-highlights (Last visited on 01/08/2019). 
29 Chinese expansion into Spanish ports market, port.today,  
Available at https://port.today/chinese-expansion-spanish-ports-market/ 
(Last visited on 03/08/2019). 
30 Kavalski, E. (2019): “China’s ‘16+1’ Is Dead? Long Live the ‘17+1.’”, The Diplomat, 29/03/2019, 
https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/chinas-161-is-dead-long-live-the-171/ Last visited on 28/07/2019. 
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will lead to an even greater asymmetry between the EU and China. As we have 
stated before, there are two complimentary policies in respect of BRI, which require 
a thorough examination: the 16+1 and the Southern Europe Initiatives. 
3. THE CEE 16+1 AND CHINA AND SOUTHERN EUROPE INITIATIVES 
According to the European Parliament, the 16+1 format was established 
under the following circumstances: 
 
“In 2012, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the low-growth environment in 
the EU, China set up a cooperation format with 16 CEECs [Central and Eastern 
European Countries] which share a communist past but are otherwise fairly 
heterogeneous in terms of their economic development and legal status as EU 
Member States and (potential) candidates for EU membership. China values their 
geostrategic position as a bridgehead to the EU market and a crucial transit corridor 
for its Belt and Road initiative (BRI)”31. 
 
Thus, the conditions were optimal for the kick off of such an initiative. 
Furthermore, the project eased the development of BRI. In fact, their poor economic 
conditions as well as their common XX century’s history create the suitable 
environment for the success of this Chinese project and also improve the chances 
for a probable win-win outcome: on one side, Chine gives financial support to 
CEECs and on the other side, CEECs allow China develop China’s infrastructures 
on their territories. All in all, the whole project contributes to the continental 
expansion of China. China seems to have an appeal for those countries, whereas the 
EU is not reacting in a similar way. 
The 16+1 Initiative is a cooperation framework between China and sixteen 
Central and Eastern European States. Out of the said sixteen States, eleven are EU 
member States. The system is already used by China in other regions: 
 
“The 16+1 format follows a China-defined experimental and innovative approach to 
regional cooperation, which shares common features with the other multilateral 
cooperation platforms China has created with African, east Asian, Latin American 
and Middle East countries to introduce a new type of non-Western ‘South-South’ 
multilateralism”32. 
 
                                                 
31 China, the 16+1 format and the EU, European Parliament – Briefing, 2, 
Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/625173/EPRS_BRI(2018)625173_EN.pdf 
(Last visited on 28/07/2019). 
32 Id. 
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Therefore, the 16+1 complies with one of the key factors of China’s theory 
of international relations: multilateralism33. This way, China offers its own 
alternative to the previous status quo and hence creates its own constellation. In 
other words, instead of the American way, China supports the Chinese way. 
Harmony is one of the cornerstones of China’s Weltanschauung. Harmony is a goal, 
which can be obtained via multilateralism. Furthermore, the special nuance that 
China is successfully developing is the regional multilateralism. This way, it is 
eroding the foundations of the previous hegemon.  
Premier Li Keqiang, in 2014, during an international promotion campaign in 
favor of BRI “announced the creation of a $3 billion investment fund for Central 
and Eastern European countries meant to further enhance cooperation, which 
includes plans to construct ‘a new corridor of interconnectivity’” 34. 
It is obvious that the above mentioned investment fund supports BRI, as it 
allows it to reach out across Europe. Moreover, it is complemented with one of the 
totems of modern policies: interconnectivity. As previously mentioned, this is a 
factor of common interest between the EU and China. The said statement openly 
shows the Chinese give-and-take policy, resulting in the win-win cooperation, i.e., 
the suitable framework for Chinese business.  
According to Mikko Huotari et al. “[…] the relationship has become 
increasingly symmetric, and for some critics of the EU´s foreign policy, it has even 
tilted to [sic] China’s favor in a number of areas”35. However, the said authors 
submit that the asymmetry in favor of China is evident: 
 
“In the east of Europe, China has shown a keen interest in bolstering relations with 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) through the creation of a 16+1 
dialogue that seeks to create a platform for developing China’s relations with the 
region. While the 16+1 forum is becoming an increasingly regular feature of China’s 
relations with CEE countries, and despite competition for leadership among the CEE 
countries, it is China that really plays the leading role within this new framework. At 
the same time, in Western Europe the forum has been seen as a matter of potential 
concern about China´s strategy to divide or even challenge the EU, as five out of the 
                                                 
33 Multilateralism, an essential element of China’s external policies, does not dovetail with the EU’s 
view, based on multilateral international organizations. 
However, a terminological distinction is due: there is some confusion, as shown in the transcription of a 
conference by Benita Ferrero-Waldner. She distinguishes between multipolarism, promoted by China (as 
a way out of the previous US-URSS bipolarism) and the EU, which is in favour of “effective” 
multilateralism (as in international organizations, e.g. UN). 
Ferrero-Waldner, B. (2005): “The EU, China and the Quest for a Multilateral World”, European 
Commission, Press Release Database, Available at https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-05-
414_en.htm (Last visited on 10/08/2019). 
34 Rolland, N. (2015): “China’s New Silk Road”, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Published: 
February 12, 2015, available at 
https://www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-new-silk-road/ 
(Last visited on 31/07/2019). 
35 Huotari, M., Otero-Iglesias, M., Seaman, J. and Ekman, A., op .cit, 8. 
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sixteen European countries involved in the discussions are currently outside of the 
Union” 36. 
 
This is an outstanding effect of the asymmetrical UE-China relationship, and 
it is obvious that the said asymmetry is rather in favor of China nowadays. 
Moreover, this asymmetry is increasing and does not show any signals for a 
decrease. Furthermore, it could be guessed whether Western Europe is approaching 
a similar system to the 16+1, with China offering financial support to Western 
Europe. Cases as those of Italy and Greece could bother Western European 
countries and authorities in Brussels. Such possibility cannot be dismissed, given 
the strength of China’s economy as well as the faint Western European finance. 
Regarding Southern European countries, China has improved its 
performance in Europe via investments, given the financial predicament caused by 
the harsh debt crisis in Europe. China has bought a large part of European countries’ 
sovereign bonds, and it is apparently the second country holding most of Spain’s, 
although the exact amount is unknown37. 
In this respect, one of China’s most significant moves was the previously 
mentioned acquisition by the Chinese state-owned company Cosco of a controlling 
stake in the port of Piraeus38. Piraeus can be considered as a bridgehead into Central 
and Western Europe. Logically, with the aid of such a stronghold, further 
movements will be more feasible.  
The latest development in this regard is Italy, which has borrowed loans from 
China-led AIIB. Before such operation was completed, Su Hao expressed that 
 
“China has been cooperating mainly with developing countries in Asia and Africa 
under the Belt and Road Initiative framework. But if China and Italy were to sign a 
memorandum of cooperation, China would also be working with a developed 
economy in Southern Europe, as well as a G7 member and an important link in the 
ancient Silk Road, to promote the Belt and Road Initiative. Hit by several crises 
including the debt and refugee crises, European countries are seeking new growth 
points. Confronted with development bottlenecks and a rising unemployment rate, 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 11. 
European Union – Member countries of the EU, 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en 
(Last visited on 5/03/2017). 
37 Otero-Iglesias, M. (2014): “How much Spanish sovereign debt does China hold?”, Real Instituto 
Elcano,17/12/2014, 
Available at https://blog.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/much-spanish-sovereign-debt-china-hold/ (Last visited 
on 10/08/2019). 
38 Why is China investing heavily in south-east Europe? BBC News, 17 October 2017, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41654346 
(Last visited on 26/07/2019). 
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Italy hopes to expedite its economic recovery and achieve growth by collaborating 
with China in the Belt and Road Initiative.”39 
 
In the light of the above mentioned statement, it might be deducted that the 
collaboration between Italy and China should be a win-win case. But it is also 
bizarre, as the borrower is a G7 member which has been “hit by several crises”, and 
is suffering “development bottlenecks and a rising unemployment rate”, whereas the 
lender is a developing country which has, at least in theory, barely suffered the said 
crises and become a world player. This is the factual situation nowadays, which 
should not be ignored by the EU. No wonder Italy has joined BRI, against the stance 
of other member States and the EU itself; however, this move will have clear 
consequences at the EU level40.  
4. JOINT ANALYSIS OF BRI, 16+1 AND EU SOUTHERN COUNTRIES 
INITIATIVES 
As a matter of fact, China has established a full strategy covering goals and 
means, both in the two-sided structure (one belt, one road) as well as in the 
complementary policies (16+1 and the Southern European countries initiatives). 
BRI seems to be an adequate system to help China’s production to reach faraway 
markets. 
BRI has more influence on cohesion than TRACECA in three aspects: in 
China, where it runs along more than 4.000 km across its territory; in Central Asia; 
and in the EU, assisted by the said two further policies (the 16+1 and the Southern 
Europe initiatives). Therefore, BRI not only enhances inner cohesion in China, 
expands China-central Asia cooperation and improves China-Central Asia-EU 
connections, but it also tests EU’s cohesion. 
According to Parag Khanna and Kishore Mahbubani 
 
“Southern European countries such as Greece and Portugal, as well as those in the 
Balkans, were hit hard by the knock-on effects of the 2008 financial crisis and the 
significant contraction of European intra-bank lending that followed. With 
diminished structural adjustment funds and private capital coming from their post-
cold war patrons in Brussels and other Western capitals, the door was left open for 
China to make financial and logistical inroads into the Mediterranean.”41 
 
As the above mentioned authors submit, there was a clear window of 
opportunity for BRI, not only due to the ailing economic situation of certain 
                                                 
39 Su, H. (2019): “New cooperation model needs to be established”, BRI a new source of growth for EU, 
Belt and Road Portal, https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ghsl/wksl/83336.htm, (last visited on 28/07/2019). 
40 Borràs i Arrumí, J. (2019): “Italia, Europa y el dilema chino”. Esglobal 19/03/2019. Available at 
https://www.esglobal.org/italia-europa-y-el-dilema-chino/ (Last visited on 10/08/2019). 
41 Khanna, P. and Mahbubani, K., op. cit. 
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European countries, but also to the unsuitable and outdated EU’s financial 
structures. 
South-South multilateralism and 16+1 format have some aspects in common. 
Notwithstanding, it shouldn’t be forgotten that South-South multilateralism is 
generally held between non-Western countries. 
We find that the 16+1 and the Southern European countries initiatives are 
another case of asymmetrical relationship between the EU and China, again clearly 
in favor of the latter. However, it can be considered as a “freely accepted” 
asymmetry, since Italy, Greece and Spain have received investments from China in 
times of crisis, and they have afterwards so done in better times. 
In this regard, the European Union, in the “Joint Communication to the 
European Parliament and the Council-Elements for a new EU strategy on China” 
has claimed that such an interest shown by China should not affect the EU’s 
regional security: 
 
“One of China’s foreign policy priorities is to develop its links with Europe, and it is 
allocating significant financial and diplomatic resources to achieving this goal. It is in 
the EU’s interest to work with China to ensure that any Chinese involvement in the 
EU’s Eastern and Southern neighborhoods helps reinforce rules-based governance 
and regional security”42. 
 
Nonetheless, perhaps a China-designed strategy intended to affect the EU’s 
interests it is not necessary. It might be due to the EU’s own poor cohesion. In this 
regard, according to Parag Khanna and Kishore Mahbubani: 
 
“While Europeans have valid concerns about the cost and utility of certain Chinese-
backed infrastructure projects in Balkan countries such as Serbia, they have only 
themselves to blame for […] internal divisions over investment from China”43. 
 
Guy de Jonquières expressly submits just the opposite, claiming that China 
uses divide-and-rule tactics44. Even in case De Jonquières was right, the EU’s lack 
                                                 
42 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, European Commission, 
Brussels, 22.6.2016, JOIN(2016) 30 final; “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council-Elements for a new EU strategy on China”. 
http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/document/JOIN20160030.do 
(Last visited on 5/03/2017). 
43 Khanna, P. and Mahbubani, K., op. cit. 
44 De Jonquières, G. (2015): “The European Union’s China Policy: Priorities and Strategies for the New 
Commission”, Policy Brief, 3, available at 
https://ecipe.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/The-European-Union%E2%80%99s-China-Policy.pdf 
(Last visited on 08/06/2017). 
“…it has been an open invitation to Beijing pursue divide-andrule tactics and get its way by bypassing 
the EU’s institutions and dealing with its members bilaterally, like so many tributary states”. 
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of cohesion is a matter of fact. In this regard, Esteban and Otero-Iglesias45 submit 
that the EU member States are opting for three different stances regarding their 
relations with China: in the first group, the most assertive countries, which 
incidentally are also the most powerful, e.g. Germany or France. They advocate the 
implementation of a mechanism for the supervision of foreign investments. 
Furthermore, they are concerned about the geostrategic issues and the effects of this 
situation on the competitiveness of their companies. 
The second stance is represented by the Netherlands, the UK and the 
Scandinavian countries, who also feel uneasy about the said circumstances, but are 
not for the implementation of controlling measures. The Brexit is important in this 
respect, as the UK is the champion of this group. 
The third and last faction comprises Eastern and Southern EU member 
States, who are entirely in favor of China’s investments, despite its economic 
practices not coinciding with the EU’s. Such countries are Hungary, Greece or Italy. 
Moreover, this EU’s weakness has its consequences. Mikko Huotari et al. 
state that “[i]n fact, the contours of European relations with China are increasingly 
designed in Beijing”46. 
In other words, China keeps the initiative regarding the EU-China relations, 
but this does not only affect the said relations, but also the action capability of the 
EU itself. As an example of this, according to Justyna Misiągiewicz and Marcin 
Misiągiewicz, the EU has not shown reaction capability regarding BRI: “[…] the 
European Union has to date been slow and reluctant in responding to the ‘One Belt, 
One Road’ idea”47. 
Obviously, this lack of reaction will not only affect the EU in respect of its 
relation to China, but also, since a leadership space has been taken by China, the EU 
will have less room for maneuver not only concerning the Asian countries within 
the domain of BRI, but also regarding its Central, Eastern and Southern EU member 
States, affected by the abovementioned two complementary plans (the 16+1 project 
and the Southern Europe project) and, obviously, the AIIB. 
Moreover, what is even more stunning is that both the EU and China are 
each other’s major (or second major) trade partners. This fact should make the EU 
react, but at least, it does not in the scale and promptness that it should48.  
Apparently, the EU, with a view to revive the Silk Road, took the initiative in 
the 1990’s, but it should do more to materialize its TRACECA project, “[y]et 
                                                 
45 Esteban, M. and Otero Iglesias, M. (2019): “EU policy in the face of the Chinese challenge” 
Expert Comment 18/2019, Available at  
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elc
ano/elcano_in/zonas_in/commentary-esteban-oteroiglesias-eu-policy-face-of-chinese-challenge (Last 
visited on 10/07/2019). 
46 Huotari, M., Otero-Iglesias, M., Seaman, J. and Ekman, A., op .cit, 8. 
47 Misiągiewicz, J. and Misiągiewicz, M., op. cit., 40. 
48 Id. 
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Europe, which launched the visionary TRACECA program in the early 1990s, is 
largely absent from the scene today”49. 
The US launched the New Silk Road (NSR) initiative in 2010, but did not 
implement it either. The EU did not finished its pioneering project. In addition, the 
Chinese BRI is bringing down the curtain on TRACECA.  
Furthermore, in the case of the 16+1 project, it is not only a fully Chinese-
promoted initiative, but also it is China who has the upper hand in conducting the 
16+1 policies:  
 
“While the 16+1 forum is becoming an increasingly regular feature of China’s 
relations with CEE countries, and despite competition for leadership among the CEE 
countries, it is China that really plays the leading role within this new framework”50. 
 
As we have already analyzed, in the 16+1 initiative, out of the sixteen 
European countries, 11 are EU member states; and within the South European 
countries initiative, all of the 6 European countries are members of the EU. 
Therefore, if we add the EU member states taking part in both initiatives, the result 
is that there are 17 EU countries participating in these initiatives complementary to 
BRI. Alternatively, instead of 16+1 and six South European countries, the initiatives 
might have had the following structures: 1+5+1 (the EU+5 non EU states + China); 
and the EU (representing all the Southern European Union states) + China. The 
current 16+1 and six South European countries initiatives are not necessarily 
designed by China in order to affect the EU, but keeping in mind the lack of 
consistency from which the EU’s single voice suffers, for China it is perhaps easier 
to deal with the EU member states one at a time. Logically, the said EU member 
states would not benefit from a united position. As Mikko Huotari et al. maintain:  
 
“[…] there is no strong evidence to suggest that China has a deliberate strategy to 
divide Europe. To <the contrary, it is intra-European competition and lack of 
coordination over China that makes Europe vulnerable. In other words, China does 
not need to divide Europe because Europe is already divided”51. 
 
Anyhow, both the lack of cohesion of the EU and the proactive China’s 
policies are somehow two sides of the same coin, as stated by the newly appointed 
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, 
who three months before his designation stated that no EU member state could ever 
                                                 
49 Starr, S. F. and Cornell, S. E., “The EU and Central Asia: Developing Transport and Trade”, 
Analytical Articles, December 10th, 2015, The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 
https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13313-the-eu-and-central-asia-
developing-transport-and-trade.html 
(Last visited on 08/06/2017). 
50 Huotari, M., Otero-Iglesias, M., Seaman, J. and Ekman, A., op. cit., 8. 
51 Id. 
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hope to maintain balanced relations with China. Only within EU –he submits- will it 
be possible to keep symmetrical relations (perhaps this is also questionable, but the 
EU is in a much better position than the EU member States acting on their own). He 
claims that the EU is not an option but a necessity, if we want to sustain our model 
of society52. 
This poor cohesion within the EU does not only affect Chinese investments 
that target the EU, but also EU companies or individuals aiming to invest in China. 
The “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council - Elements 
for a new EU strategy on China” repeatedly claims that, regarding this matter, there 
is no “level playing field”, i.e. there is no reciprocity in this domain. It claims that 
Chinese investments in Europe have full possibilities and opportunities, whereas EU 
investors in China, according to the said Joint Communication, find plenty of 
difficulties53. However, recently China has adopted a new stance in this respect, 
trying to rebalance the relationship, towards a level playing field54. 
The European Parliament (EP) has criticized the 16+1 and considers that it is 
losing strength: 
 
“While in 2012 the CEECs had enthusiastically embraced this form of cooperation as 
a chance to diversify their EU-focused economic relations in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis, by 2018 some of them had voiced dissatisfaction with the economic 
results it had yielded for them. The 2018 Sofia summit guidelines for the first time 
stressed the need for a more balanced trade, reciprocity of market access and open 
tenders in infrastructure construction, thus echoing concerns the EU had repeatedly 
raised with China. Empirical evidence shows that China-CEEC trade had actually 
jumped prior to 2012, whereas afterwards it increased at a much slower pace, with 
Chinese exports to CEECs expanding much quicker than CEEC exports to China, 
thus generating an unbalanced trade that is heavily tilted in favour of China”55.  
 
Hence, despite China’s efforts to stress the character of the win-win 
cooperation, the EP states that the benefit is not at all reciprocal. Furthermore, the 
EP maintains that projects are unequally distributed: 
“Foreign direct investment (FDI) data reveal that while Chinese FDI is 
highly concentrated on the biggest CEECs, it accounts for an extremely low share of 
total FDI stock. Some smaller CEECs have started to attract Chinese FDI as well, 
although at comparatively low levels. Some of China’s infrastructure construction 
                                                 
52 Borrell, J. (2019): “Europa, entre China y EEUU”, La Vanguardia, available at 
https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20190325/461208061029/europa-china-eeuu.html (Last 
visited on 10/08/2019). 
53 “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council-Elements for a new EU strategy 
on China”, op. cit. 
54 China ofrece a UE igualdad trato a empresas y abordar subsidios industriales. EFE Bruselas 
9/04/2019. Available at https://www.efe.com/efe/espana/economia/china-ofrece-a-ue-igualdad-trato-
empresas-y-abordar-subsidios-industriales/10003-3948129 (Last visited on 10/08/2019). 
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projects in the CEECs have suffered setbacks in a regional environment governed 
by EU norms and regulations”56. 
Nonetheless, China, with its ample range of initiatives, seems to be in a 
better position to compete. Parag Khanna and Kishore Mahbubani submit that 
 
“[…] Italy has become the 14th European Union member to sign a memorandum with 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative. European neglect is to blame for Chinese 
opportunism. Far too often, Europe allows itself to be divided by outside powers, 
blaming them rather than itself”57. 
 
In any case, the EP has complained about the trade and investment barriers: 
 
“Unsatisfactory economic outcomes for the CEECs may not merely be due to the 
obvious asymmetry in market size, but also to trade and investment barriers: 
according to the European Commission’s market barriers database, China has 25 of 
these, in second place only to Russia (34). Such results have given rise to 
disappointment and scepticism even among major CEECs such as Poland, which runs 
the highest trade deficit with China”58. 
 
The above mentioned statement measures the EU’s and China’s respective 
market barriers. But in this regard there is another vision, comparing the access of 
EU’s and American companies to China’s markets: Parag Khanna and Kishore 
Mahbubani submit that “[a]s China slowly opens up its markets, in the name of the 
reciprocity the West demands, corporate Europe appears most likely to reap the 
benefits [compared to corporate US]” 59. 
This perspective sets aside the EU’s vision of the level playing field. 
However, regarding the access to China’s markets, this still grants some advantages 
to EU’s companies, compared to the US’s. 
Chen Zhi Min and Zhang Ji maintain that, according to the “double-layered” 
special support of the European foreign policy for the “one belt one road” strategy, 
China, in different strategic domains, should adopt differing styles concerning goals, 
points of contact, and through four developing ways, give shape to the reciprocal 
“double-layered” positive China-EU reciprocal system: first, in a horizontal 
direction, aiding member States in order to find innovative ways of cooperation; 
second, in a upward way, receiving the aid of member states in order to model the 
EU policies regarding China with a view to enhance the China-EU cooperation; 
third, in a downward way, creating at the EU level, cooperation in the fields of 
policies, laws and public opinion; and fourth, overflow abroad, promoting through 
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58 China, the 16+1 format and the EU, European Parliament – Briefing, op. cit. 4. 
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the China-EU double-layered linkup the rest of areas comprised along BRI as well 
as the China-EU cooperation worldwide60.  
At first glance, we see a primary point of asymmetry compared with the EU, 
i.e. the meticulous analysis China does of the EU’s policy and strategy. China 
develops its own strategy through its idiosyncratic examination of the EU. Such a 
methodical way of thinking helps promote cooperation, and the EU might 
appreciate the advantages of this attitude. However, the EU finds itself just in the 
opposite situation. Mikko Huotari et al. claim that “[m]ost of the interactions with 
China happen at the national level, and overlooking them would be a mistake” 61.  
Guy de Jonquières states that “[Europe] needs to be able to speak with one 
voice and not give China the opportunity to play the game of divide and rule with 
Europe” 62. 
The said wishes, expressed by De Jonquières, do not seem so far to be 
feasible in the short term. But they should be considered by the EU. 
A critical point regarding BRI is expressed by Nicholas Rosellini. He doubts 
whether the BRI initiative will only bring economic development or will also 
enhance the human development of the peoples along BRI. Another key element 
will be the sustainability of the initiative. Following Rosellini, the UN and its 
programmes will play a decisive role for the success of BRI, always keeping in 
mind the achievement of the SDGs63. SDGs, i.e. the Sustainable Development 
Goals, are aims established by the UN, in order to improve the living standards of 
humankind as well as enable the survival of the planet64. 
According to Mikko Huotari et al., in Western Europe the 16+1 initiative has 
been considered as a matter of potential concern about China´s strategy to divide or 
even challenge the EU, as five out of the sixteen European countries involved in the 
discussions are currently outside of the Union65. 
In this regard, we analyze this view complemented with that submitted by 
Guy de Jonquières, according to which China is practicing a divide-and-rule 
                                                 
60 Chen, Zhimin and Zhang, Ji, op. cit., 1. 
61 Huotari, M., Otero-Iglesias, M., Seaman, J. and Ekman, A., op. cit., 12. 
62 De Jonquières, op. cit., 1. 
63 Rosellini, N. (2016): “A Shared Vision for Belt and Road Initiative”, UNDP China 10 Nov 2016,  
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strategy66. Perhaps, China does not need to use the said tactics. Chinese culture is 
very practical. Chen Zhi Min and Zhang Ji believe that  
 
“since OBOR was first launched, it has always pointed to Europe as its far end, but 
neither the EU as a whole nor its 28 member states never have had the clear 
concretion of a country along the OBOR”67. 
 
Given that there is no unity within the EU, China deals directly with the EU 
member states. China has not created this advantage for itself (the lack of cohesion 
of the EU), but since it already exists, China does its best to attain its goals. 
Regarding the impact of the BRI initiative in the EU, Alicia Garcia-Herrero 
and Xu Jianwei (徐建炜) maintain that one of the most important projects in the EU 
today is the so-called “Juncker Plan”, which basically promotes the investment in 
infrastructures. They state that this is nowadays one of the “bottlenecks” of the EU 
economy. They believe that “OBOR attaches special importance to the 
infrastructures in Eurasia” and there is a possible linkup between BRI and the 
Juncker Plan. They claim that cooperation should also enhance the electric power 
resources as well as the digital economy. The said authors add that this teamwork 
should not be just restricted to commerce and investment, but might also enhance 
the financial channels68. Both the EU and China are undertaking plans, but they 
have not linked yet to each other. The economic development is important, but it 
should also benefit the local communities throughout BRI. 
In respect of BRI investments, Jane Golley submits that 
 
                                                 
66 De Jonquières, op. cit., 3. 
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Unofficial translation. 
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是欧洲 展的瓶 之一经济发 颈 。中国的“一 一路带 ” 略 重在 欧大 的建战 侧 亚 陆 设，目前中国已 提出经 “一 一路带 ” 略与欧洲容克战
划的 接计 对 ，共享基 施投 方面的投 和 合作础设 资 资 经验 ，增 欧大 的基 施强亚 陆 础设 、 力能源以及数字 的建 投 与电 经济 设 资 连
接， 得 一步加以 性推值 进 实质 动。在“一 一路带 ”框架下，中欧可以开展的合作可以不 局限于 易与投仅仅 贸 资，金融渠道（ 如
外商直接投 和 券投 流资 证 资 动） 也具有很大的相关潜力，尤其是人民 跨境离岸市 的建立也可以助力加以推币 场 动。除此以外
，通 推过 动“一 一路带 ” 略的中欧合作战 ， 可以 一步增 中欧双方的互信程度还 进 强 ，有助于解决 如是否授 市 地位等诸 权 场经济
争 性议 问题。” 
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“[…] these are investments that are happening in high risk countries […] where there 
is lots of corruption, there is a possibility that all this could go horribly wrong if 
unprofitable investments are made and money gets lost along the way”69.  
 
However, China is determined to go ahead with the project, being self-
confident that this plan will raise the Asian giant to new heights. The RMB (Chinese 
currency) might even compete with the US dollar as the world’s reference 
currency70. 
Furthermore, there is a key legal factor, which is common to many 
megaregional integration projects: the impact of such projects in the governance of 
the worldwide trade system, due to its influence in the international trade 
normativity and, especially, the one established by the WTO71. Barack Obama was 
in favor of this idea, showed in his “Statement by the President on the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership”: 
 
“When more than 95 percent of our potential customers live outside our borders, we 
can’t let countries like China write the rules of the global economy. We should write 
those rules, opening new markets to American products while setting high sta 
ndards for protecting workers and preserving our environment”72. 
 
However, after the US quitted the TPP, according to the said opinion, China 
might influence the normativity in global trade. The EU, in turn, could take 
advantage of the opportunity73. 
Nadège Rolland maintains that the repercussion of BRI to the world is its 
greater cooperation between nations. Nonetheless, she states that “[…] what China 
                                                 
69 Quoted by Alexander, R., op. cit. 
70 Alexander, R., op. cit. 
71 Rocha Pino, M. de J. (2017): “Los proyectos de integración megarregional de China: el caso de la 
iniciativa Cinturón y Ruta (CYR)”, Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional, vol. XVII, 547-589, p. 
557, available at http://www.redalyc.org/pdf/4027/402750094016.pdf (Last visited on 05/07/2017). 
72 Statement by the President on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, The White House – President Barack, 
Obama, The White House – Office of the Press Secretary,  
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/05/statement-president-trans-pacific-
partnership 
(Last visited on 27/07/2017). 
Quoted by Rocha Pino, M. de J. op. cit., 557. 
73 Charlemagne, “As the world sours on trade, the EU sweetens on it”, The Economist, Print Edition – 
Europe, March 30th 2017, 
https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21719801-top-agenda-deal-japan-world-sours-trade-eu-
sweetens-it 
(Last visited on 28/7/2017). 
“One of the American president’s first acts was to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a 
trade deal covering a dozen countries around the Pacific Rim. Mr Trump complains about Germany’s 
trade surplus, and his administration hints that it will ignore rulings from the World Trade Organisation. 
The leader of the free world is pulling up the drawbridge, and the EU (which negotiates trade deals on 
behalf of its member governments) has spotted an opportunity.” 
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is offering us is a window into discovering what kind of great power it wants to 
be”74. 
Naturally, China establishes BRI as a plan in its own interest, but the 
countries covered by it might also benefit from the said project.  
According to Emilián Kavalski: 
 
“China’s cooperation with CEE countries has attracted a growing barrage of criticism 
from the European Union (EU). In the past three years, EU officials have lambasted 
China for allegedly undermining the European integration process by turning the CEE 
countries into “Trojan horses” and sowing division in the continent. Some have even 
demanded that China adopt a “One Europe” policy just as the EU supports the “One 
China” policy.”75 
 
Hence, the cohesion of the EU is affected by the said initiatives. However, 
the EU is suffering from its own lack of common ground. Otherwise, it would not 
have been affected by China’s initiatives. 
Furthermore, according to Lilei Song and Dragan Pavlićević, the CEE 16+1 
Initiative is increasing the asymmetries between China and the CEEs: 
 
“Reflective of the asymmetry in economic power between China and participating 
countries, most of the proceedings, institutions and programs initiated within these 
frameworks are bankrolled by China. Beijing has furthermore used these mechanisms 
to extend loans, and facilitate China’s outward investment toward these regions, 
which further illustrates and amplifies the asymmetry in economic power between 
China and the countries participating in these multilateral frameworks”76. 
 
Apparently, the 16+1 initiative is not failing: Emilián Kavalski claims that it 
is growing, due to Greece’s probable accession; therefore, the initiative would soon 
change its name to 17+1: 
 
“So what can we expect this year? First, the ninth summit of the China-CEE 
cooperation is indeed likely to be the last one for the 16+1. The reason, however, is 
not what one (especially the EU) might expect. Instead, Greece is almost certainly 
going to be invited to become part of the initiative. This will effectively turn the 
“16+1” into the “17+1.” Such a move seems to corroborate the claims that the 
significance of CEE countries for China is closely intertwined with the acquisition by 
COSCO of the controlling share of the Greek port of Piraeus. Some have even 
claimed that Beijing is at least partially responsible for the resolution of the name 
dispute between Greece and Macedonia as China is keen to connect the port of 
                                                 
74 Rolland, N., op. cit. 
75 Kavalski, E. op. cit. 
76 Song, L. and Pavlićević, D. (2019): “China’s Multilayered Multilateralism: A Case Study of China 
and Central and Eastern Europe Cooperation Framework”. Chinese Political Science Review 4, 277–302, 
278. Available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-019-00127-z (Last visited on 05/08/2019). 
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Piraeus via Macedonia to its proposed high-speed rail link between Belgrade and 
Budapest and then onwards to the western part of the continent”77. 
 
According to the above statement, a key element of BRI is interconnectivity, 
however, not only regarding infrastructures, but also from the point of view of the 
development of policies, as the creation of a network will enhance the chances of 
success. 
According to Andrés Ortega, BRI is a strategy concerning Eurasia; China, he 
maintains, is interested in the European ports, from Piraeus (Greece) to Sines 
(Portugal). Andrés Ortega quotes Bruno Maçaes, who considers that China’s aim is 
to reduce its freight costs, competing with the north European routes. Andrés Ortega 
submits that the EU’s Connecting Europe & Asia strategies are much more 
modest78. 
5. THE BEIJING (MAY 2017) BELT AND ROAD FORUM 
On 14.05.2017 the Belt and Road Forum was held in Beijing. 28 Heads of 
State and Government, together with 1.200 delegates from countries from across the 
world79, as well as the heads of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank (WB) and the United Nations attended the said Forum. The Forum was a 
conference aimed at promoting BRI.  
As Linda Yueh has noted:  
 
“Essentially, China is taking a leadership role where the United States has begun to 
pull back. So, for China this is a strategy that actually makes sense both economically 
and geopolitically […] the scale of One Belt One Road is absolutely massive; it’s 
nearly a trillion dollars of planned investments […]”80. 
 
As we can see, the asymmetry is not just about the comparison between the 
EU and China, but is also affecting the relations between China and the United 
States, resulting in favor of China. Obviously, China’s GDP is still lower than the 
US’s, but such a project as BRI has been undertaken by China, which shows that 
China is keen on leadership. The US promoted the Marshall Plan, which was an 
                                                 
77 Kavalski, E. (2019): “China’s ‘16+1’ Is Dead? Long Live the ‘17+1.’”, The Diplomat, 29/03/2019, 
https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/chinas-161-is-dead-long-live-the-171/ Last visited on 28/07/2019. 
78 Ortega, A. (2019): “Europa se quita el velo chino”. El Espectador Global, por Andrés Ortega, Real 
Instituto Elcano 02/04/2019. Available at https://blog.realinstitutoelcano.org/europa-se-quita-el-velo-
chino/ (Last visited on 10/08/2019). 
79 Moody, A., “Belt and Road forum: China to forge global connections”, The Telegrapgh News – World 
News, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world/china-watch/politics/belt-and-road-forum-
beijing/ 
(Last visited on 23/05/2017). 
80 Yueh, L., One Belt One Road, Business Daily BBC, available at  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0527zz7 (Last visited on 23/05/2017). 
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enormous task, but it took place 70 years ago. In other words, the fact of promoting 
BRI shows China’s capability to take the initiative and assume the role of a world 
player. 
Both China and the US have something in common: they are launching their 
respective policies in order to compete with the EU, obviously including the 
economy. Of late, China’s surge and the US’s corresponding resistance have caused 
commercial and technological conflicts between both countries, thus causing 
anxiety throughout the world. The most recent skirmish between both sides has been 
the pressure on their respective currencies, in August 2019. 
Justyna Misiągiewicz and Marcin Misiągiewicz consider that “[t]he idea of 
‘One Belt, One Road’ will promote China as a soft power and attractive player in 
the global market”81. In fact, this BRI vision as a means of soft power will be a key 
element for the future development of the EU-China relations, but, as we have 
already analyzed, it will also deepen the asymmetry between both sides. 
BRI could work as a test bench for China’s international relations, especially 
regarding the EU. China, as a world player, is keen on the idea of responsibility 
concerning worldwide development (负责任大国fuzeren daguo) and it might take 
advantage of BRI as a unique opportunity to put into practice its skills in the field of 
soft power82. This shift to soft power is also based on its terminological preference, 
for example, the use of the terms “proposal, idea or framework”, instead of 
“strategy”. Hence, China highlights that BRI has no political intent83. 
The EU has reacted to the 16+1 Initiative (or, as the European Parliament 
names it, the 16+1 format): on the one hand, it promotes a pre-accession investment 
agenda, mostly in the Western Balkans; on the other hand, it stresses the key issue: 
 
“A June 2018 own-initiative report on EU-China relations by the European 
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (Rapporteur: Bas Belder, ECR, the 
Netherlands), due to be debated in plenary in September 2018, stresses among other 
things that Member States’ participation in the 16+1 format must enable the EU to 
speak with one voice in its relationship with China”84. 
 
Summing up, the EU will have fewer chances to survive, unless it keeps a 
united voice. BRI is an enormous challenge, but just by the mere fact of undertaking 
such a risky project, it is obvious that China is enhancing its position through a 
leader’s vision. And, should China succeed, it would be a crucial test for the Asian 
giant, and, simultaneously, for the future of the EU. 
  
                                                 
81 Misiągiewicz, J. and Misiągiewicz, M., op. cit., 33. 
82 Id. 
83 Ibid., 37. 
84 China, the 16+1 format and the EU, European Parliament – Briefing, op. cit., 8. 
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6. THE REACTION OF THE EU 
EU’s reaction is laid out in two essential documents: “Connecting Europe & 
Asia - The EU strategy” and “Towards a new EU policy approach to China 21st EU-
China Summit – April 2019”. Both documents have been authored by the EP. 
The first said document follows the style of BRI, given that one of its 
cornerstones is connectivity. Moreover, it mentions terms as “people”, “society” or 
“environment”. The document has a social perspective85. 
The second document states the following: 
 
“In a fairly unusual move ahead of the forthcoming EU-China summit, on 12 March 
2019, shortly before the EU-China High-Level Strategic Dialogue of 18 March, the 
EU published a ‘strategic outlook’ for EU-China relations, to be debated at that 
week’s European Council meeting. The paper refers to a shift in the balance of 
challenges and opportunities the EU faces in its ties with China; it moves away from 
portraying China as a strategic partner towards an issue-based, differentiated framing 
of China as a cooperation partner, a negotiating partner, an economic competitor and 
a systemic rival. It spells out three goals: to ‘deepen its engagement with China to 
promote common interests at global level’, based on clearly defined interests and 
principles; to ‘seek more balanced and reciprocal economic relations’; and to ‘adapt 
to changing economic realities and strengthen its own domestic policies and industrial 
base’. It sets out 10 actions, and stresses that Member States need to apply a uniform 
approach to China to achieve these goals”86. 
 
There are two key factors in the above mentioned statement. Firstly, the EP 
demands from China “more balanced and reciprocal economic relations”. The term 
“more balanced” concerns the trade imbalance, and the term “reciprocal” refers to 
the level playing field, two common terms in the EU’s wording regarding China. 
Secondly, the EP requires from the EU a “uniform approach to China”, i.e. unity. In 
the unlikely event that both aims were achieved in the short term, the EU would 
reach an ideal status in its relations with China. 
The same document, stressing some of the key elements of the EU’s policies 
regarding China, states the following: 
 
“In its resolution on the state of EU-China relations, the EP called for enhanced EU 
engagement with China on global challenges and in support of multilateralism, 
                                                 
85 “Connecting Europe&Asia – The EU strategy”, European Parliament, 
Available at https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/europe_asia_connectivity_factsheet_1.pdf 
(Last visited on 02/07/2019). 
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April 2019, available at  
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building on successful cooperation on peacekeeping and anti-piracy. It stresses that 
China-led initiatives require a unified EU response and that the imbalance in EU-
China economic ties needs to be tackled”87. 
 
Once again, the EU stresses the importance of unity within the EU. 
Moreover, the EU-China Summit (Brussels, 9 April 2019) Joint statement 
submits what follows: 
 
“The two sides will continue to forge synergies between the EU strategy on 
Connecting Europe and Asia as well as the EU Trans-European Transport Networks 
and China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and welcome the agreement, in the framework 
of the EU-China Connectivity Platform, on the terms of reference for the Joint Study 
on sustainable Railway-based Corridors between Europe and China. The two sides 
will enhance communication within the framework of the EU-China Connectivity 
Platform”88. 
 
Thus, interconnectivity is becoming a key element of the EU agenda 
regarding China. The text above mentions the terms “forge synergies” and “joint 
study”. This could be a humble and realistic approach to the situation. Cooperation 
could be a possibility. Time will speak. 
BRI might well have unexpected effects on the EU, as stated by Parag 
Khanna and Kishore Mahbubani: 
 
“Equally importantly, the surge in Chinese investment in Africa serves Europe’s 
fundamental long-term interests. Only the economic development of Africa will 
prevent more migrants going into Europe”89. 
 
This is another outlook on the effects of BRI on the EU’s cohesion. 
However, this remains to be seen, and it will be barely possible to assess the cause-
effect relation. 
7. CONCLUSION  
In a globalized world, any minor move could have faraway resonances, let 
alone such huge enterprises as TRACECA and BRI. The basic comparison between 
both sides is: which side is coming closer to the other? So far, China is drawing 
much closer to the EU than vice versa. Hence, it is up to the EU to respond and 
adapt to the situation. 
                                                 
87 Ibid., 2. 
88 EU-China Summit Joint statement Brussels, 9 April 2019, op. cit. 
89 Khanna, P. and Mahbubani, K., op. cit. 
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Some autors, e.g. Jane Golley90 and Tom Holland91, consider that, regarding 
BRI, perhaps the Asian giant will fail. For the time being, it is difficult to ascertain. 
The fact is that China is one of the few world players undertaking such enormous 
enterprises. Meanwhile, the EU is not speaking with a single voice to face such 
huge challenges. 
BRI is an enormous and risky task for China, but it could also boost its 
chances to become, once and for all, a world player. The EU has already lost the 
initiative, and perhaps should start studying the Chinese idiosyncrasy, and thus 
follow a better approach to its competitor. For instance, the Chinese think that in 
every crisis there is an opportunity. BRI might be a suitable test for the Europeans 
to show their resilience, and the EU deserves its place as a major world economy 
with a future. Given the asymmetry in favor of BRI, compared to TRACECA, a 
proper reaction could be to make joint efforts in order to enhance Eurasian 
connectivity. The EU is already starting to move in this direction, as shown in the 
2019’s EU-China Summit Joint statement.  
There are evident asymmetries in magnitude and scope between TRACECA 
and BRI. In this respect, China’s AIIB is a giant (half the size of the World Bank, 
and growing) compared to the EU financial resources concerning the EU-China 
interconnectivity. 
BRI might be a boost for China’s rule-making aspirations, i.e. BRI could 
raise China to the category of order-shaper. However, BRI is only part of China’s 
long-term globalising strategy. 
A key element in the whole issue is interconnectivity which is not only the 
means for China’s production to reach all corners of the world, but also the tool for 
China to spread its influence. Furthermore, interconnectivity is both a method, and a 
goal in itself, as it helps China to sell its own railway industry and finally, to project 
a powerful image as a world champion. Moreover, interconnectivity is also 
intermodal, as China makes nearly no exceptions regarding its progress: it can 
promote railways, buy ports or acquire sovereign portfolios. All this network results 
in more influence. 
Unity within the EU is not a choice, but a necessity, as no EU member State 
could hope to keep balanced relations with China. The EU should consider 
undertaking a deep renewal of its policies regarding BRI, including at least the 
following issues: attaining more cohesion, invigorating its decision-making 
proceedings and improving its long-term vision. In this new EU phase, started after 
the designation of the European institutions in May 2019 (new European 
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Parliament, Commission, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, etc.) the relationship with China is a critical issue.  
The key question is to find the suitable instruments and formats. So far, the 
framework analyzed in this article (TRACECA, BRI, 16+1, Southern Europe) is, to 
say the least, controversial, because it does not create a suitable environment for a 
common policy. Cases such as Italy, Greece or the CEE show that the pace of 
China’s progress has been much faster than expected. 
The EU and China should make a coordinated effort to rebalance their 
relationship, as History has taught us that symmetrical relations are more stable, 
lasting and peaceful. 
Obviously, the EU should learn from the previous naivety in its relationship 
with China, as Emmanuel Macron has admitted92. The EU and China need to 
become more cooperative, since they have common interests, and thus may enjoy a 
great measure of win-win cooperation. 
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